Suchergebnisse

La condizionalità è strumento di governo relativamente nuovo nel quadro dell'Unione europea. Dopo una breve ricostruzione storica dell'evoluzione della condizionalità europea, dei tipi di condizionalità e dei pro e dei contro evidenziati in dottrina, il contributo esamina la sua configurazione e attuazione nell'ambito della politica di coesione, dell'assistenza finanziaria durante la crisi dell'Eurozona e, infine, nell'ambito del Next Generation EU. Particolare spazio è dedicato all'analisi del Regolamento sul regime di condizionalità per la protezione del bilancio europeo, della giurisprudenza europea e del suo seguito. Mentre si metteranno in risalto i nodi critici tuttora irrisolti, si manifesta un generale apprezzamento dell'uso dell'istituto, pur evidenziando la necessità di un maggior rigore nell'analisi delle sue conseguenze costituzionali a livello europeo, ad oggi in larga parte trascurate.

This paper deals with the influence exerted by the Council of Europe, notably by the Venice Commission, and by the European Union on constitutional amendments with a special focus on Italy, a founding member state of both organisations. It proceeds as follows: it first provides a quick introduction into the vexata questio of the difficult balance between rigidity and flexibility of democratic Constitutions, well-illustrated by the academic debate and by the Venice Commission's Report on constitutional amendments of 2010 (CDL-AD(2010)001). Second, the paper considers which European standards have been set, especially by the Venice Commission, to design an effective and legitimate constitutional amendment procedure, and whether the Italian constitutional provisions and practice have abide to them. Third, the contribution reflects on the influence exerted by the Italian participation in the Council of Europe and in the European Union on the substance of the amendments adopted to the Italian Constitution. It is argued that at least since the mid-Twentieth century constitutional amendments procedures can no longer be treated as purely national phenomena. They are more and more guided by standards set at supranational level, notably by the Venice Commission, as derived by the European common constitutional heritage. The influence is exerted both on a procedural level, defining what can be called as the "due process" of constitutional revision, and on a more substantive level. ; This paper deals with the influence exerted by the Council of Europe, notably by the Venice Commission, and by the European Union on constitutional amendments with a special focus on Italy, a founding member state of both organisations. It proceeds as follows: it first provides a quick introduction into the vexata questio of the difficult balance between rigidity and flexibility of democratic Constitutions, well-illustrated by the academic debate and by the Venice Commission's Report on constitutional amendments of 2010 (CDL-AD(2010)001). Second, the paper considers which European standards have been set, especially by the Venice Commission, to design an effective and legitimate constitutional amendment procedure, and whether the Italian constitutional provisions and practice have abide to them. Third, the contribution reflects on the influence exerted by the Italian participation in the Council of Europe and in the European Union on the substance of the amendments adopted to the Italian Constitution. It is argued that at least since the mid-Twentieth century constitutional amendments procedures can no longer be treated as purely national phenomena. They are more and more guided by standards set at supranational level, notably by the Venice Commission, as derived by the European common constitutional heritage. The influence is exerted both on a procedural level, defining what can be called as the "due process" of constitutional revision, and on a more substantive level. ; Niniejszy artykuł dotyczy wpływu wywieranego przez Radę Europy, zwłaszcza przez Komisję Wenecką, oraz Unię Europejską na procedury zmiany konstytucji, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem Włoch, państwa założycielskiego obu organizacji. We wstępie omówiono problematykę trudnej równowagi między sztywnością a elastycznością demokratycznych konstytucji, dobrze zilustrowaną przez debatę akademicką oraz Raport Komisji Weneckiej w sprawie poprawek konstytucyjnych z 2010 r. (CDL-AD(2010)001). W artykule rozważono także, jakie standardy europejskie zostały ustanowione, zwłaszcza przez Komisję Wenecką, w celu zaprojektowania skutecznej i zgodnej z prawem procedury zmiany konstytucji oraz czy włoskie przepisy konstytucyjne i praktyka dostosowały się do nich. Ponadto rozważono wpływ uczestnictwa Włoch w Radzie Europy i Unii Europejskiej na treść poprawek przyjętych do włoskiej konstytucji. Argumentuje się, że co najmniej od połowy XX w. procedury poprawek konstytucyjnych nie mogą być już traktowane jako zjawiska czysto narodowe. W coraz większym stopniu kierują się one standardami ustalonymi na poziomie ponadnarodowym, zwłaszcza przez Komisję Wenecką, wynikającymi z europejskiego wspólnego dziedzictwa konstytucyjnego. Wpływ ten wywierany jest zarówno na płaszczyźnie proceduralnej, określającej to, co można nazwać "należytym procesem" rewizji konstytucyjnej, jak i na płaszczyźnie bardziej merytorycznej.

This paper deals with the influence exerted by the Council of Europe, notably by the Venice Commission, and by the European Union on constitutional amendments with a special focus on Italy, a founding member state of both organisations. It proceeds as follows: it first provides a quick introduction into the vexata questio of the difficult balance between rigidity and flexibility of democratic Constitutions, well-illustrated by the academic debate and by the Venice Commission's Report on constitutional amendments of 2010 (CDL-AD(2010)001). Second, the paper considers which European standards have been set, especially by the Venice Commission, to design an effective and legitimate constitutional amendment procedure, and whether the Italian constitutional provisions and practice have abide to them. Third, the contribution reflects on the influence exerted by the Italian participation in the Council of Europe and in the European Union on the substance of the amendments adopted to the Italian Constitution. It is argued that at least since the mid-Twentieth century constitutional amendments procedures can no longer be treated as purely national phenomena. They are more and more guided by standards set at supranational level, notably by the Venice Commission, as derived by the European common constitutional heritage. The influence is exerted both on a procedural level, defining what can be called as the "due process" of constitutional revision, and on a more substantive level. ; This paper deals with the influence exerted by the Council of Europe, notably by the Venice Commission, and by the European Union on constitutional amendments with a special focus on Italy, a founding member state of both organisations. It proceeds as follows: it first provides a quick introduction into the vexata questio of the difficult balance between rigidity and flexibility of democratic Constitutions, well-illustrated by the academic debate and by the Venice Commission's Report on constitutional amendments of 2010 (CDL-AD(2010)001). Second, the paper considers which European standards have been set, especially by the Venice Commission, to design an effective and legitimate constitutional amendment procedure, and whether the Italian constitutional provisions and practice have abide to them. Third, the contribution reflects on the influence exerted by the Italian participation in the Council of Europe and in the European Union on the substance of the amendments adopted to the Italian Constitution. It is argued that at least since the mid-Twentieth century constitutional amendments procedures can no longer be treated as purely national phenomena. They are more and more guided by standards set at supranational level, notably by the Venice Commission, as derived by the European common constitutional heritage. The influence is exerted both on a procedural level, defining what can be called as the "due process" of constitutional revision, and on a more substantive level. ; Niniejszy artykuł dotyczy wpływu wywieranego przez Radę Europy, zwłaszcza przez Komisję Wenecką, oraz Unię Europejską na procedury zmiany konstytucji, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem Włoch, państwa założycielskiego obu organizacji. We wstępie omówiono problematykę trudnej równowagi między sztywnością a elastycznością demokratycznych konstytucji, dobrze zilustrowaną przez debatę akademicką oraz Raport Komisji Weneckiej w sprawie poprawek konstytucyjnych z 2010 r. (CDL-AD(2010)001). W artykule rozważono także, jakie standardy europejskie zostały ustanowione, zwłaszcza przez Komisję Wenecką, w celu zaprojektowania skutecznej i zgodnej z prawem procedury zmiany konstytucji oraz czy włoskie przepisy konstytucyjne i praktyka dostosowały się do nich. Ponadto rozważono wpływ uczestnictwa Włoch w Radzie Europy i Unii Europejskiej na treść poprawek przyjętych do włoskiej konstytucji. Argumentuje się, że co najmniej od połowy XX w. procedury poprawek konstytucyjnych nie mogą być już traktowane jako zjawiska czysto narodowe. W coraz większym stopniu kierują się one standardami ustalonymi na poziomie ponadnarodowym, zwłaszcza przez Komisję Wenecką, wynikającymi z europejskiego wspólnego dziedzictwa konstytucyjnego. Wpływ ten wywierany jest zarówno na płaszczyźnie proceduralnej, określającej to, co można nazwać "należytym procesem" rewizji konstytucyjnej, jak i na płaszczyźnie bardziej merytorycznej.

Independent fiscal institutions (IFIs) have been established or reformed in all eurozone countries following the reform of economic governance. As they are expected to counter the deficit bias of the governments and the information asymmetry of the legislatures and the public over the management of the budget, IFIs may support or even strengthen parliamentary accountability. This hypothesis is tested with regard to three IFIs, the Irish Fiscal Advisory Council, the Italian Parliamentary Budget Office, and the Spanish Independent Authority for Fiscal Responsibility. Although the economic context in which the IFIs were created was similar in the three eurozone countries, as was their mandate, these institutions have a rather different institutional positioning, being within the Parliament, in Italy; within the Executive, in Spain; and a stand-alone body in Ireland. This is likely to influence the IFIs' contribution to parliamentary accountability, we hypothesize that the closer the position of an IFI and its contacts to the parliament, the stronger is the scrutiny of the executive on budgetary policies. The analysis of parliamentary questions, hearings, and of the activation of the 'comply or explain' procedures shows that, overall, the IFIs' potential role to enhance parliamentary accountability has remained underexploited by the three legislatures, with no significant differences as for the institutional positioning of the IFI.

The article analyses whether and how the activity of populist governments in Italy has affected the performance of parliament's legislative and scrutiny functions. The analysis covers the government of Five Star Movement (5SM) and the Lega as well as the coalition government made up of the 5SM, the Democratic Party and centre-left junior allies up to the COVID-19 outbreak. The article uses selected bills and decree-laws to investigate the impact on the legislative function, while question time sessions and committees of inquiry are examined as case studies on the scrutiny function. The analysis demonstrates that although 'subversive' constitutional and parliamentary conduct was already in place beforehand, when populists entered government in the 18th legislative term there was a worsening of a trend towards eroding representative democracy.

Independent fiscal institutions (IFIs) have been established or reformed in all eurozone countries following the reform of economic governance. As they are expected to counter the deficit bias of the governments and the information asymmetry of the legislatures and the public over the management of the budget, IFIs may support or even strengthen parliamentary accountability. This hypothesis is tested with regard to three IFIs, the Irish Fiscal Advisory Council, the Italian Parliamentary Budget Office, and the Spanish Independent Authority for Fiscal Responsibility. Although the economic context in which the IFIs were created was similar in the three eurozone countries, as was their mandate, these institutions have a rather different institutional positioning, being within the Parliament, in Italy; within the Executive, in Spain; and a stand-alone body in Ireland. This is likely to influence the IFIs' contribution to parliamentary accountability, we hypothesize that the closer the position of an IFI and its contacts to the parliament, the stronger is the scrutiny of the executive on budgetary policies. The analysis of parliamentary questions, hearings, and of the activation of the 'comply or explain' procedures shows that, overall, the IFIs' potential role to enhance parliamentary accountability has remained underexploited by the three legislatures, with no significant differences as for the institutional positioning of the IFI.

Richard Albert's book offers a crucial systematization of constitutional amendments, their forms, procedures and scope. In doing so, it provides important insights on the theory and the practice of constitutional amendment design, the difficulty they face and the varieties of unamendability, amongst other things. This contribution seeks to apply Richard Albert's analysis to the case of the European Union, where the existence of a fully-fledged Constitution has long been contested. It claims that this analytical framework can help to better understand the functioning of EU "constitutional amendments", i.e. Treaty revisions, and their limits, in a context where they have remained substantially understudied.

Richard Albert's book offers a crucial systematization of constitutional amendments, their forms, procedures and scope. In doing so, it provides important insights on the theory and the practice of constitutional amendment design, the difficulty they face and the varieties of unamendability, amongst other things. This contribution seeks to apply Richard Albert's analysis to the case of the European Union, where the existence of a fully-fledged Constitution has long been contested. It claims that this analytical framework can help to better understand the functioning of EU "constitutional amendments", i.e. Treaty revisions, and their limits, in a context where they have remained substantially understudied.

Abstract
The EU Speakers' Conference has experienced a 'second youth' after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon by playing a 'quasi-constitutional' role in inter-parliamentary cooperation, and in particular by trying to exercise a rule-making function over the many inter-parliamentary venues of the EU's system of government. The fulfilment of such a function has certainly not been made any easier as a consequence of the constitutional constraints surrounding the positions of the Speakers and Presidents of the European and Member States' (MS) Parliaments, with a considerable variety in terms of powers and decision-making capacity among the MS and the EU. Despite these limitations, the 'quasi-constitutional' role of the EU Speakers' Conference has mainly consisted of approving guidelines, if not directly rules of procedure, for other inter-parliamentary venues. It has also been argued that the coordinating function of the EU Speakers' Conference can be much more effective when looking at its 'quasi-constitutional' role, and also in its function of joint parliamentary scrutiny in the EU, if it is aimed at enhancing the rational organisation of inter-parliamentary activities in terms of timing, agendas and ex-post supervision of the results, in the absence of any other possible alternative to the Speakers' leadership.